Is Democracy the Engine of Economic Growth?
Prof. Bedford N. Umez, Ph.D.*
One of the arguments that is often made to explain problems of
development in authoritarian regimes (such as the present day Nigeria and some
other African nations) is the one that blames development problems on lack of
democracy. The essence of this argument (referred here as
democracy-leads-to-economic growth perspective) is that lack of democracy is
the major cause of the problems of development in Nigeria. Before considering
this argument, let me first define democracy.
In this context, I shall use the word "democracy" to mean a statement about
sovereignty and nothing else. This, I believe, is the proper use. Sovereignty
can reside in one person, a selected few (as we have seen time and time again
in many African countries, especially in Nigeria), or the whole adult
population. Sovereignty in the adult population is established and nurtured
when a representative government permits and maintains certain basic
principles; only then can such be properly and assertively called a
"democracy." These principles are (a) universal political participation, (b)
political equality, (c) majority rule (with substantive recognition of the
minority rights), (d) rule of law, (e) government responsiveness to the public
opinion, and, of course, (f) the basic freedoms of speech, press, assembly,
religion, and organization.1
The Issues and Implications
According to democracy-leads-to-economic growth perspective, Nigeria should
establish democracy first in order to achieve economic growth because the
military is not equipped to play a developmental role in the economic sphere.
Perhaps the best known version of this perspective is presented by Alexander
Madiebo. He states:
A military government is a major set back for any nation and should be avoided
at all costs. This is because military men are unqualified for the task of
government and either lean too heavily on advice which may not always be in
the best interest of their people or, worse still, attempt to rule without
it.2
Henry Bienen and Eric Nordlinger argue that the militaries are akin to
interest groups; as such, they are more concerned with the advancement of
their own corporate interests (e.g., military autonomy, salaries, and arms
procurement) even when such interests are clearly at odds with those of the
larger society.3 Thus, the military will be more apt to increase its own
budget and proportionately reduce the budget allocated to civilian and
non-defense projects.4 Samuel Decalo argues that militaries are hardly
organizations. Rather, some factions of the military are self-interested
players of a Hobbesian political environment, preoccupied with their own
selfish aggrandizement which tend to retard economic growth.5
Within Nigeria, there are additional (though related) reasons why many
Nigerians (in particular) are presently clamoring for democracy -- the return
of the civilian government. First, is the ascendancy of the Nigerian military
in governance and the present economic decline in Nigeria. It is an
indisputable fact that Nigerian economy has been declining,6 and that Nigeria
is one of the most coup prone nations in Africa.7 In fact, military
intervention has become an integral part of the electoral cycle in Nigeria
that in thirty-eight years, from the time of independence (1960) to the
present (1998), the military has ruled Nigeria for twenty-eight of those
years.
While it is beyond the confines of this book to provide a comprehensive of the
various studies which outline the differences between military and civilian
governments, it is instructive that some of the attributes assigned to the
military, e.g., pursuit of narrow interests, apply equally to the civilian
leaders. This point is exemplified by the pursuit of their own interest.
Clearly, self-interest may be at odds with what serves the collective good. To
that extent, neither the military nor a civilian government in Nigeria would
assure development. Thus, the underlying question in this chapter: is
democracy a precondition for economic growth?
It is clear that a democratic process is preferable to a military rule.
Compared to a military rule, democratic principles, when enforced, provide a
more stable environment for investments, and therefore likely to promote
economic growth. It is common knowledge that business investors are usually
reluctant to invest in a polity in which coups and counter coups remain the
means of changing governmental personnel. Indeed, progressive economic
performance is better assured with a democratically elected civilian
leadership than within the military.
In addition, democracy provides periodic elections that allow people to change
(and control) their government personnel (and in some cases, government
policies through referenda). Accordingly, elected officials are presumed to
respond to the public opinion or risk rejection at the poll. The assumed
relationship between democratically elected leaders and the citizens is based
on reciprocity.
Military rule, on the other hand, does not provide direct mechanisms that
allow the people to control the military personnel or its policies. In fact,
in a military rule, the question becomes who will police the military? Above
all, the record of the military regime in terms of civil rights leaves a lot
to be desired because most authoritarian regimes do not tolerate opposition,
and therefore do not guarantee civil liberties.
Notwithstanding the positive virtues of a democratic government (which, in
principle, makes democracy far better than a military rule), I maintain that
democracy is not self-executing, and therefore, does not automatically lead to
economic growth. While the democratic process (hence, the principles of
democracy) better guarantees performance for the people, one must be reminded
that Nigeria has miserably failed in at least two attempts at democracy,
1960-1966 and 1979-1983. The first civilian government (1960-1966) did not
keep Nigeria one. The last republic (1979-1983) was known to be generally
corrupt.9
Corruption destroys any economy because instead of serving the people, corrupt
officials start serving their own narrow selfish interests (thereby creating a
government of the few, by the few, for the few). Just as some people are
skeptical about investing in a country ruled by the military, some prefer not
to invest in a nation mired in corruption. Nigerian leaders and the elite must
rise above corruption; they must obey the laws of the land; they must have
consideration for their fellow Nigerians; they must be democratic at heart;
they must be selfless, honest and committed to better serve the interest of
the country at large; and they must be truly patriotic. And when this is done,
a sound economy will be established, and democracy will be maintained, and
preserved.
Often, I compare democracy with Rose Royce, and a corrupt official with one
who does not know how to drive a car but nonetheless wants to drive, Mr. "I
Too Know" (ITK). Rose Royce is generally believed to be one of the best cars,
built to last for a long time. However, if Mr. ITK (who does not know how to
drive a car) is entrusted with driving this Rose Royce, this nice car might be
wrecked in a matter of seconds. Conversely, if we entrust this Rose Royce with
a good driver, the life of this car and its beauty are likely to be extended
and preserved, ceteris paribus.
Just as Rose Royce is believed to be one of the best cars, democracy is
believed to be the best form of government primarily because its principles
are geared toward serving the interest of the larger public, hence, government
of the people by the people. However, if corrupt, selfish, inconsiderate, and
mindless officials are elected in a democracy, they will destroy the economy
and democracy itself (just as Mr. ITK will destroy the Rose Royce), democratic
principles and good laws notwithstanding. It is obvious that corrupt officials
do not obey the laws and democratic principles; and, as we know, the real
essence of any law lies in its implementation. If laws and democratic
principles are only partially observed or totally ignored, what then is left
of democracy? Frankly, nothing desirable!
Since that is the case, one is therefore compelled to ask these fundamental
questions: Why did these two civilian regimes (particularly, the last one)
fail in the first place? Specifically, is lack of democracy in Nigeria the
ROOT of:
i. the prevailing value system "of he who no dey fast, na him go board last
mentality" that encourages and endorses corrupt practices as necessary, and
sufficient means to ends?
ii. the reason why some (if not most) Governors and their accomplices in the
last democratic government (1979-1983) buried thousands of public funds
(Naira, Pounds, and Dollars) in their private homes for private use10 (while
Nigerians teachers, and civil servants went on for months without pay)?
iii. the reason why some public officials in Nigeria -- military and civilian
officials alike – callously embezzle public funds and send them to their
private bank accounts in foreign countries11 – the countries that either
directly or indirectly enslaved, colonized, exploited, and marginalized
Nigeria, and many other African countries?
iv. a flagrant disobedience to laws at almost all levels of government solely
for the quest for illegal, and ill-gotten money?
v. ethnocentrism and its unhealthy inter-ethnic rivalries?
vi. intra-ethnic bigotry, evidenced in a feeling of some superiority of
certain section(s) of the same ethnic group over others?
vii. extravagant display of wealth, punctuated with lavish parties that often
entail blockade of roads used for the normal businesses in Nigerian big
cities?
viii. arrogance, evidenced in title mania, with its associated class
consciousness, and class antagonisms?
If we ignore questions like these, we shall allow the name of democracy, or
the search for it, to serve as a cloak for every kind of abomination and
folly, short-sighted policies, blatant tyranny, incompetent bureaucracy, sheer
greed, avarice, and social oppression in Nigeria.
Let me address, at this juncture, another point about the relationship between
democracy and economic growth. It has been argued that lack of democracy in
Nigeria is the cause of the problems of development because the civilian
governments have not enjoyed the length of time as the military; as such
democracy did not have the opportunity to thrive.
There is no doubt that the military has been in power for over 71 percent of
the time in Nigeria. However, did not civilian leaders actually have the
opportunity to sow the seeds of progress but failed to do so? Specifically,
how do we explain some cases of corruption and embezzlement of public funds
within the past civilian government? Or have Nigerians forgotten the rampant
corruption within the last republic?
Besides, if the Nigerian elite truly believe that military must go, how can
one explain the nomination of the late Gen. Sani Abacha by the then five
political parties (April 20, 1998) as the only qualified presidential
candidate for the scheduled August 1, 1998 presidential election? Put
differently, if we buy the argument that Nigerians are tired of the military
government, and believe that military is the major problem and therefore must
leave Nigerian politics, what then prompted these parties to select Gen.
Abacha, the then incumbent military leader, as the only qualified presidential
candidate? Common sense tells one that if these parties really wanted military
out of the Nigerian politics, they could have not nominated Abacha, a military
man, to be the only sole presidential candidate for the scheduled August 1,
1998 presidential election. Those in my camp understand that mere change of
dress, from the military [khaki] uniform to the traditional civilian "Agbada"
dress cannot significantly alter someone's character.
But even if one accepts the theory that mere change of dress can substantially
alter one's character, one is still troubled by the idea of selecting one man
to be the only qualified presidential candidate in a nation of over 100
million. Democratic theory, as we know, presupposes, among others, that any
qualified citizen can run and be voted for by the people, and whoever gets
majority votes wins. Further, it suggests, in the interest of legitimacy, that
there should be choices of candidates from which people choose. But to these
parties, the right of the people to choose among five competing presidential
candidates is not a part of their own defined democracy.
Related to the choice factor, is the obvious fact that one-man presidential
race does not (and cannot) offer any room for presidential debates. It is
palpably clear that there are serious issues confronting Nigeria. As such,
serious debates and discussions (among and between competing groups) to
address those issues are of considerable importance. But how can Nigerians
hold genuine presidential debates on those relevant national issues if and
when one man becomes the only presidential candidate? In light of the fact
that no man holds a debate against himself, one-man presidential race (no
mater the candidate and his/her attributes) is incapable of adequately
addressing relevant divisive issues confronting Nigeria. Presidential debates
on relevant national issues are paramount in a society of diverse groups and
diverse interests (as in Nigeria) because two [thinking] heads are far better
than one.
To further demonstrate that lack of "democracy" is not the major problem
facing Nigeria, let us examine the request these parties made to Abacha’s
successor, Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar (June 17, 1998). On June 17, 1998, these
same political parties that selected "King Solomon" Abacha as the only
presidential candidate, appealed to Gen. Abubakar to end Nigeria’s tradition
of military meddling in politics, cancel the results of all local and regional
elections held under Abacha's reign, and extend Abacha's political transition
to civilian rule for three to 12 months in order to "seek credibility" for the
transition program.12 Tacitly, they admitted that Abacha’s transition program
was a sham.
Notice that yesterday (call it the period before the death of Abacha), it was
all perfect and dandy for them to nominate one man, Abacha (in a nation of
over 100 million people) as the ONLY qualified person to rule Nigeria. At that
time, Abacha was "credible" and the transition program was superb. As such,
Abacha was the one, and so Nigeria should not be looking for another. Had it
been that Abacha lived, accepted their offer, and became the civilian
president of Nigeria under "democracy," no one would know, at least from them,
that the whole democratic transition program lack "credibility." But when
nature exposed their "infinite wisdom" in nominating "King Solomon" as the
only qualified ruler in Nigeria, they started calling for reforms,
cancellation of the previous elections and the postponement of the date for
the hand-over. Is it not ironic that the same people who nominated Abacha as
the "Messiah" of Nigeria accused his transition program of lacking
"credibility" only after his death? In my view, Nigerians deserve to know what
made Abacha’s transition program lack "credibility" so that credibility will
be assured in Abubakar’s and future transition programs.
Tacitly conceding that the transition program set by Abacha was flawed, Gen.
Abubakar ordered (July 20, 1998) that the electoral commission created by
Abacha be dismantled, regional and local elections canceled, and the five
state-sponsored political parties dissolved. In addition, he announced that
the presidential elections should be held by February 1999 and that Nigeria
should return to civilian rule in May 1999. According to him, "Nigerians want
nothing less than true democracy in a united and peaceful country."13
I welcome this announcement, as I have been welcoming all the announcements to
return Nigeria to a democracy. However, some relevant issues are yet to be
addressed. Nigerian government must take some concrete and specific measures
to stop the "fox" from entering the Nigerian "hen" house. So far as the
revolving doors that keep on bringing corrupt men and women into Nigerian body
politics are not tightly closed, elections after elections, parties after
parties, constitutions after constitutions, and republics after republics in
the name of democracy will continue to be ineffectual in solving Nigeria’s
problems of development because the major source of the problem (discussed
below) is basically ignored.
The major source of problems in Nigeria, as I view it, is caused by "ajo mmadu"
– the wicked people. "Ajo mmadu" will always destroy and destroy and destroy.
They are sadists who enjoy inflicting wounds on others while watching them die
slowly by the way side. These "ajo mmadu" are the ones who have kept Nigeria
in this state of economic, political and social mess all this time. They
embezzle public funds with God-forbidden impunity. They cause scarcity of
gasoline in a country that is ranked among the top in crude oil production.
They constantly interfere with the electricity even in hospitals with patients
on life-support machines. They lie to the people, and often dress themselves
in borrowed robes and fake titles. All these wicked acts are all motivated by
bribery and corruption produced by the value system of "he who no dey fast, na
him go board last." That is where the major problem lies; it is "ajo mmadu,"
pure and simple.
Therefore, formation of new parties today and the cancellation of the previous
elections will not matter a bit so far as the "ajo mmadu" are practicing their
sadism in Nigeria. So far as the revolving doors keep bringing them in,
changing dress from khaki to "agbada," or changing parties, canceling
elections, writing and rewriting the constitutions will NOT solve Nigeria's
major problems of development. In fact, doing these things over and over often
means enriching these people (and those waiting on the wings to rob the nation
when their time comes). After all, there is no election in Nigeria that is
free of alleged fraudulent practices. These ones conducted last year (1997)
were not the first and neither will they be the last. The most effective
solutions to Nigeria's major problems (including those with the Abacha’s
transition program) lie with the good leaders – those who are guided by the
principles of "charity begins at home," patriotism, and consideration for
others -- the true meaning of democracy.
It is time Nigerians started calling a spade a spade and a garden fork a
garden fork. Democracy cannot thrive in a society where the rich continue to
get richer (at the expense and exploitation of the masses) and the poor are
subjected to perpetual and agonizing death. The pursuit of democracy, though
an excellent idea, must not lead Nigerians (or other people for that matter)
to ignore the basic engine that establishes, and makes civilization run,
namely, economic growth (brought about by good leaders dedicated to bring
development to their country). Once a nation's well being is neglected, i.e.,
once most of the leaders in a democracy start serving their own interests
instead of those of the people, the regime's legitimacy will be eroded, and
democracy will surely die. In fact, there is an impressive body of empirical
evidence demonstrating that economic crises of various types can trigger
transitions from democratic regime to authoritarian regime.14 The
survivability of a regime (including the democratic regime of the US, as a
matter of fact) depends upon the performance of the regime itself. A polity
cannot provide economic prosperity, welfare and domestic order -- the overall
good living standards -- if the leaders do not care for the common good. In a
simple language, Nigeria will not survive if the leaders typically subscribe
to the prevalent habits of decay in Nigeria that encourage corrupt practices
as necessary and sufficient means to ends.
Conclusion
To conclude, the basic argument of this paper is quite simple. Democracy is
the best form of government when its principles are enforced. The military
governance is the worst option for the reasons adumbrated at the beginning of
this paper. However, one must recognize that democracy, just in name, does not
stop a criminal from being a criminal. All we know (about the democratic
process) is that over a period of time, the institutions, the economic
structure, and the whole business of laws, and law-making will be maintained
according to the wishes and desires of the people. This is only true if all
other matters so vital to the success of a country (e.g., patriotism,
commitment, great vision, investments on the part of the leaders and the
elite, and genuine consideration for others) are taken seriously by those who
are elected in a democracy. Indeed, it is pure illusion to assume that answers
to any society’s problems will be forthcoming by mere repetition of democracy
(as if it were an incantation against the evils perpetuated by men against
men) nor by an authoritarian military rule (established under the guise of
curbing corruption). Nigeria will continue to experience economic downturn,
and democracy is bound to fail in Nigeria, as it has failed at least twice, if
the [civilian] leaders and the elite fail to provide and maintain the overall
good living standards of the people -- the welfare of the state.
Therefore, success of a democratic government depends upon the morally guided
and sagacious leaders (and the elite) who are determined to work for the
growth and development of every aspect of the whole country, be it political
development (democracy), economic development, or good human relations. When
this commitment is demonstrated, there will be economic growth -- the people
will be well fed. And when people are well fed, they are likely to obey laws,
respect the rights of others, accept conventional means of political
participation, and generally observe the principles and the values of
democracy. The maxim that "a hungry man is an angry man," underscores this
point.
Above all, economic prosperity brings other developments that are conducive
for democracy, namely, industrialization, communication, and most importantly,
education which fosters a good understanding of say the rule of law, and
harmonic ethnic relations. These developments encourage, advance, and sustain
democracy, and they can only come about in a strong economy built and
maintained by TRULY educated Nigerian leaders, i.e., Nigerians with the common
sense to understand that investment at home is the engine of economic growth.
Only these kinds of men and women will say NO to the prevailing value system
that encourages and endorses corrupt practices in Nigeria. Only these kinds of
men and women will say NO to disobedience to laws, inter-ethnic rivalries,
intra-ethnic conflicts and bigotry, excessive display of wealth, and
arrogance. Only these kinds of men and women will say NO to neglect of true
education, embezzlement of public funds, colonial mentality, and inferiority
complex. Only these men and women will say YES to the principle of charity
begins at home, and not abroad, consequently encouraging investment in
Nigeria, instead of creating greener pastures abroad.
In sum, democracy (DE), when its principles are religiously enforced, brings
economic growth because more people tend to invest in a democracy (as
explained at the beginning of this paper). Economic growth (EG), on the other
hand, is a sine qua non for maintaining democracy (DE). However, the
preservation of democracy and maintenance of economic growth are a function
(f) of the good leaders (GLs) who are determined to work for the growth and
development of every aspect of the whole country. Symbolically, this:
DE <===> GE = f (GLs)
If Nigerians continue to ignore this obvious fact, the next republic will
follow the same failed path of the previous ones, all things being equal.
Notes
1. See, in particular, Howard Zinn, "How Democratic Is America," in Robert E.
DiClerico and Allan S. Hammock (ed.), Points of View: Readings in American
Government and Politics,(New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995), 2-13; Janda, et
al., The Challenge of Democracy: Government in America, (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1995), 33-37.
2. Alexander A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War (Enugu:
Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980), 386.
3. Henry Bienen, (ed.) The Military and Modernization,(Chicago: Aldine, 1971);
Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic
and Social Change in the Non-Western States," American Political Science
Review, Vol. 64 (1970), 1131-1148. Henry Bienen, Soldiers in Politics:
Military Coups and Governments, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976).
4. Ibid.
5. For details, see Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1976).
6. See, Izevbuwa Osayimwese and Sunday Iyare, "The Economics of Nigerian
Federalism: Selected Issues in Economic Management," Publius: The Journal of
Federalism, Vol. 21 (Fall 1991), 97.
Pat McGowan, and Thomas Johnson, "Six Coups in Thirty Years - Further Evidence
Regarding African Military Coups d'Etat," The Journal of Modern African
Studies, Vol. 24 (1986), 540-546.
Ladipo Adamolekun, "Introduction: Federalism in Nigeria," Publius: The Journal
of Federalism, Vol. 21 (Fall 1991), 2-3.
See Eric Umeh, "Debt Crisis in Nigeria: Is it Macroeconomic Debtor
Mismanagement
or Imprudent Credit Lending? A Case Study," Unpublished Master's Thesis, Texas
Woman's University, Denton, Texas, May 1992, 41-42.
10. Ibid.
11. "We at the Citibank had a large account deposited FROM NIGERIA (my
emphasis). When the Nigerian government changed hands in a military coup, some
of the new authorities came to claim the money of someone in the previous
regime. They were NASTY THUGS (emphasis mine). We called the police, and the
police did some checking. They came back to me the next day and said, 'Mr.
Dessauer, you don't have to worry about these fellows anymore.' We put them on
a plane to Nigeria and told the Nigerian embassy if they ever tried this stunt
again we would send all Nigerians home." [Statements by John Dessauer, the
former top Citibank official (Swiss branch), as quoted in THE NIGERIAN, May,
1996, p. 3.]
12. African Herald, July 1998, 12
13. Online Posting. Washington Post: http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WAPO/
19980720/v000021-072098-idx.html
14. Henry Bienen, The Military and Modernization, (Chicago: Aldine, 1978),
221.





