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Is Democracy the Engine of Economic Growth?
Prof. Bedford N. Umez, Ph.D.*
One of the arguments that is often made to explain problems
of development in authoritarian regimes (such as the present day
Nigeria and some other African nations) is the one that blames
development problems on lack of democracy. The essence of this
argument (referred here as democracy-leads-to-economic growth
perspective) is that lack of democracy is the major cause of the
problems of development in Nigeria. Before considering this
argument, let me first define democracy.
In this context, I shall use the word "democracy" to mean a
statement about sovereignty and nothing else. This, I believe, is
the proper use. Sovereignty can reside in one person, a selected few
(as we have seen time and time again in many African countries,
especially in Nigeria), or the whole adult population. Sovereignty
in the adult population is established and nurtured when a
representative government permits and maintains certain basic
principles; only then can such be properly and assertively called a
"democracy." These principles are (a) universal political
participation, (b) political equality, (c) majority rule (with
substantive recognition of the minority rights), (d) rule of law,
(e) government responsiveness to the public opinion, and, of course,
(f) the basic freedoms of speech, press, assembly, religion, and
organization.1
The Issues and Implications
According to democracy-leads-to-economic growth perspective, Nigeria
should establish democracy first in order to achieve economic growth
because the military is not equipped to play a developmental role in
the economic sphere. Perhaps the best known version of this
perspective is presented by Alexander Madiebo. He states:
A military government is a major set back for any nation and should
be avoided at all costs. This is because military men are
unqualified for the task of government and either lean too heavily
on advice which may not always be in the best interest of their
people or, worse still, attempt to rule without it.2
Henry Bienen and Eric Nordlinger argue that the militaries are akin
to interest groups; as such, they are more concerned with the
advancement of their own corporate interests (e.g., military
autonomy, salaries, and arms procurement) even when such interests
are clearly at odds with those of the larger society.3 Thus, the
military will be more apt to increase its own budget and
proportionately reduce the budget allocated to civilian and
non-defense projects.4 Samuel Decalo argues that militaries are
hardly organizations. Rather, some factions of the military are
self-interested players of a Hobbesian political environment,
preoccupied with their own selfish aggrandizement which tend to
retard economic growth.5
Within Nigeria, there are additional (though related) reasons why
many Nigerians (in particular) are presently clamoring for democracy
-- the return of the civilian government. First, is the ascendancy
of the Nigerian military in governance and the present economic
decline in Nigeria. It is an indisputable fact that Nigerian economy
has been declining,6 and that Nigeria is one of the most coup prone
nations in Africa.7 In fact, military intervention has become an
integral part of the electoral cycle in Nigeria that in thirty-eight
years, from the time of independence (1960) to the present (1998),
the military has ruled Nigeria for twenty-eight of those years.
While it is beyond the confines of this book to provide a
comprehensive of the various studies which outline the differences
between military and civilian governments, it is instructive that
some of the attributes assigned to the military, e.g., pursuit of
narrow interests, apply equally to the civilian leaders. This point
is exemplified by the pursuit of their own interest. Clearly,
self-interest may be at odds with what serves the collective good.
To that extent, neither the military nor a civilian government in
Nigeria would assure development. Thus, the underlying question in
this chapter: is democracy a precondition for economic growth?
It is clear that a democratic process is preferable to a military
rule. Compared to a military rule, democratic principles, when
enforced, provide a more stable environment for investments, and
therefore likely to promote economic growth. It is common knowledge
that business investors are usually reluctant to invest in a polity
in which coups and counter coups remain the means of changing
governmental personnel. Indeed, progressive economic performance is
better assured with a democratically elected civilian leadership
than within the military.
In addition, democracy provides periodic elections that allow people
to change (and control) their government personnel (and in some
cases, government policies through referenda). Accordingly, elected
officials are presumed to respond to the public opinion or risk
rejection at the poll. The assumed relationship between
democratically elected leaders and the citizens is based on
reciprocity.
Military rule, on the other hand, does not provide direct mechanisms
that allow the people to control the military personnel or its
policies. In fact, in a military rule, the question becomes who will
police the military? Above all, the record of the military regime in
terms of civil rights leaves a lot to be desired because most
authoritarian regimes do not tolerate opposition, and therefore do
not guarantee civil liberties.
Notwithstanding the positive virtues of a democratic government
(which, in principle, makes democracy far better than a military
rule), I maintain that democracy is not self-executing, and
therefore, does not automatically lead to economic growth. While the
democratic process (hence, the principles of democracy) better
guarantees performance for the people, one must be reminded that
Nigeria has miserably failed in at least two attempts at democracy,
1960-1966 and 1979-1983. The first civilian government (1960-1966)
did not keep Nigeria one. The last republic (1979-1983) was known to
be generally corrupt.9
Corruption destroys any economy because instead of serving the
people, corrupt officials start serving their own narrow selfish
interests (thereby creating a government of the few, by the few, for
the few). Just as some people are skeptical about investing in a
country ruled by the military, some prefer not to invest in a nation
mired in corruption. Nigerian leaders and the elite must rise above
corruption; they must obey the laws of the land; they must have
consideration for their fellow Nigerians; they must be democratic at
heart; they must be selfless, honest and committed to better serve
the interest of the country at large; and they must be truly
patriotic. And when this is done, a sound economy will be
established, and democracy will be maintained, and preserved.
Often, I compare democracy with Rose Royce, and a corrupt official
with one who does not know how to drive a car but nonetheless wants
to drive, Mr. "I Too Know" (ITK). Rose Royce is generally believed
to be one of the best cars, built to last for a long time. However,
if Mr. ITK (who does not know how to drive a car) is entrusted with
driving this Rose Royce, this nice car might be wrecked in a matter
of seconds. Conversely, if we entrust this Rose Royce with a good
driver, the life of this car and its beauty are likely to be
extended and preserved, ceteris paribus.
Just as Rose Royce is believed to be one of the best cars, democracy
is believed to be the best form of government primarily because its
principles are geared toward serving the interest of the larger
public, hence, government of the people by the people. However, if
corrupt, selfish, inconsiderate, and mindless officials are elected
in a democracy, they will destroy the economy and democracy itself
(just as Mr. ITK will destroy the Rose Royce), democratic principles
and good laws notwithstanding. It is obvious that corrupt officials
do not obey the laws and democratic principles; and, as we know, the
real essence of any law lies in its implementation. If laws and
democratic principles are only partially observed or totally
ignored, what then is left of democracy? Frankly, nothing desirable!
Since that is the case, one is therefore compelled to ask these
fundamental questions: Why did these two civilian regimes
(particularly, the last one) fail in the first place? Specifically,
is lack of democracy in Nigeria the ROOT of:
i. the prevailing value system "of he who no dey fast, na him go
board last mentality" that encourages and endorses corrupt practices
as necessary, and sufficient means to ends?
ii. the reason why some (if not most) Governors and their
accomplices in the last democratic government (1979-1983) buried
thousands of public funds (Naira, Pounds, and Dollars) in their
private homes for private use10 (while Nigerians teachers, and civil
servants went on for months without pay)?
iii. the reason why some public officials in Nigeria -- military and
civilian officials alike – callously embezzle public funds and send
them to their private bank accounts in foreign countries11 – the
countries that either directly or indirectly enslaved, colonized,
exploited, and marginalized Nigeria, and many other African
countries?
iv. a flagrant disobedience to laws at almost all levels of
government solely for the quest for illegal, and ill-gotten money?
v. ethnocentrism and its unhealthy inter-ethnic rivalries?
vi. intra-ethnic bigotry, evidenced in a feeling of some superiority
of certain section(s) of the same ethnic group over others?
vii. extravagant display of wealth, punctuated with lavish parties
that often entail blockade of roads used for the normal businesses
in Nigerian big cities?
viii. arrogance, evidenced in title mania, with its associated class
consciousness, and class antagonisms?
If we ignore questions like these, we shall allow the name of
democracy, or the search for it, to serve as a cloak for every kind
of abomination and folly, short-sighted policies, blatant tyranny,
incompetent bureaucracy, sheer greed, avarice, and social oppression
in Nigeria.
Let me address, at this juncture, another point about the
relationship between democracy and economic growth. It has been
argued that lack of democracy in Nigeria is the cause of the
problems of development because the civilian governments have not
enjoyed the length of time as the military; as such democracy did
not have the opportunity to thrive.
There is no doubt that the military has been in power for over 71
percent of the time in Nigeria. However, did not civilian leaders
actually have the opportunity to sow the seeds of progress but
failed to do so? Specifically, how do we explain some cases of
corruption and embezzlement of public funds within the past civilian
government? Or have Nigerians forgotten the rampant corruption
within the last republic?
Besides, if the Nigerian elite truly believe that military must go,
how can one explain the nomination of the late Gen. Sani Abacha by
the then five political parties (April 20, 1998) as the only
qualified presidential candidate for the scheduled August 1, 1998
presidential election? Put differently, if we buy the argument that
Nigerians are tired of the military government, and believe that
military is the major problem and therefore must leave Nigerian
politics, what then prompted these parties to select Gen. Abacha,
the then incumbent military leader, as the only qualified
presidential candidate? Common sense tells one that if these parties
really wanted military out of the Nigerian politics, they could have
not nominated Abacha, a military man, to be the only sole
presidential candidate for the scheduled August 1, 1998 presidential
election. Those in my camp understand that mere change of dress,
from the military [khaki] uniform to the traditional civilian "Agbada"
dress cannot significantly alter someone's character.
But even if one accepts the theory that mere change of dress can
substantially alter one's character, one is still troubled by the
idea of selecting one man to be the only qualified presidential
candidate in a nation of over 100 million. Democratic theory, as we
know, presupposes, among others, that any qualified citizen can run
and be voted for by the people, and whoever gets majority votes
wins. Further, it suggests, in the interest of legitimacy, that
there should be choices of candidates from which people choose. But
to these parties, the right of the people to choose among five
competing presidential candidates is not a part of their own defined
democracy.
Related to the choice factor, is the obvious fact that one-man
presidential race does not (and cannot) offer any room for
presidential debates. It is palpably clear that there are serious
issues confronting Nigeria. As such, serious debates and discussions
(among and between competing groups) to address those issues are of
considerable importance. But how can Nigerians hold genuine
presidential debates on those relevant national issues if and when
one man becomes the only presidential candidate? In light of the
fact that no man holds a debate against himself, one-man
presidential race (no mater the candidate and his/her attributes) is
incapable of adequately addressing relevant divisive issues
confronting Nigeria. Presidential debates on relevant national
issues are paramount in a society of diverse groups and diverse
interests (as in Nigeria) because two [thinking] heads are far
better than one.
To further demonstrate that lack of "democracy" is not the major
problem facing Nigeria, let us examine the request these parties
made to Abacha’s successor, Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar (June 17,
1998). On June 17, 1998, these same political parties that selected
"King Solomon" Abacha as the only presidential candidate, appealed
to Gen. Abubakar to end Nigeria’s tradition of military meddling in
politics, cancel the results of all local and regional elections
held under Abacha's reign, and extend Abacha's political transition
to civilian rule for three to 12 months in order to "seek
credibility" for the transition program.12 Tacitly, they admitted
that Abacha’s transition program was a sham.
Notice that yesterday (call it the period before the death of Abacha),
it was all perfect and dandy for them to nominate one man, Abacha
(in a nation of over 100 million people) as the ONLY qualified
person to rule Nigeria. At that time, Abacha was "credible" and the
transition program was superb. As such, Abacha was the one, and so
Nigeria should not be looking for another. Had it been that Abacha
lived, accepted their offer, and became the civilian president of
Nigeria under "democracy," no one would know, at least from them,
that the whole democratic transition program lack "credibility." But
when nature exposed their "infinite wisdom" in nominating "King
Solomon" as the only qualified ruler in Nigeria, they started
calling for reforms, cancellation of the previous elections and the
postponement of the date for the hand-over. Is it not ironic that
the same people who nominated Abacha as the "Messiah" of Nigeria
accused his transition program of lacking "credibility" only after
his death? In my view, Nigerians deserve to know what made Abacha’s
transition program lack "credibility" so that credibility will be
assured in Abubakar’s and future transition programs.
Tacitly conceding that the transition program set by Abacha was
flawed, Gen. Abubakar ordered (July 20, 1998) that the electoral
commission created by Abacha be dismantled, regional and local
elections canceled, and the five state-sponsored political parties
dissolved. In addition, he announced that the presidential elections
should be held by February 1999 and that Nigeria should return to
civilian rule in May 1999. According to him, "Nigerians want nothing
less than true democracy in a united and peaceful country."13
I welcome this announcement, as I have been welcoming all the
announcements to return Nigeria to a democracy. However, some
relevant issues are yet to be addressed. Nigerian government must
take some concrete and specific measures to stop the "fox" from
entering the Nigerian "hen" house. So far as the revolving doors
that keep on bringing corrupt men and women into Nigerian body
politics are not tightly closed, elections after elections, parties
after parties, constitutions after constitutions, and republics
after republics in the name of democracy will continue to be
ineffectual in solving Nigeria’s problems of development because the
major source of the problem (discussed below) is basically ignored.
The major source of problems in Nigeria, as I view it, is caused by
"ajo mmadu" – the wicked people. "Ajo mmadu" will always destroy and
destroy and destroy. They are sadists who enjoy inflicting wounds on
others while watching them die slowly by the way side. These "ajo
mmadu" are the ones who have kept Nigeria in this state of economic,
political and social mess all this time. They embezzle public funds
with God-forbidden impunity. They cause scarcity of gasoline in a
country that is ranked among the top in crude oil production. They
constantly interfere with the electricity even in hospitals with
patients on life-support machines. They lie to the people, and often
dress themselves in borrowed robes and fake titles. All these wicked
acts are all motivated by bribery and corruption produced by the
value system of "he who no dey fast, na him go board last." That is
where the major problem lies; it is "ajo mmadu," pure and simple.
Therefore, formation of new parties today and the cancellation of
the previous elections will not matter a bit so far as the "ajo
mmadu" are practicing their sadism in Nigeria. So far as the
revolving doors keep bringing them in, changing dress from khaki to
"agbada," or changing parties, canceling elections, writing and
rewriting the constitutions will NOT solve Nigeria's major problems
of development. In fact, doing these things over and over often
means enriching these people (and those waiting on the wings to rob
the nation when their time comes). After all, there is no election
in Nigeria that is free of alleged fraudulent practices. These ones
conducted last year (1997) were not the first and neither will they
be the last. The most effective solutions to Nigeria's major
problems (including those with the Abacha’s transition program) lie
with the good leaders – those who are guided by the principles of
"charity begins at home," patriotism, and consideration for others
-- the true meaning of democracy.
It is time Nigerians started calling a spade a spade and a garden
fork a garden fork. Democracy cannot thrive in a society where the
rich continue to get richer (at the expense and exploitation of the
masses) and the poor are subjected to perpetual and agonizing death.
The pursuit of democracy, though an excellent idea, must not lead
Nigerians (or other people for that matter) to ignore the basic
engine that establishes, and makes civilization run, namely,
economic growth (brought about by good leaders dedicated to bring
development to their country). Once a nation's well being is
neglected, i.e., once most of the leaders in a democracy start
serving their own interests instead of those of the people, the
regime's legitimacy will be eroded, and democracy will surely die.
In fact, there is an impressive body of empirical evidence
demonstrating that economic crises of various types can trigger
transitions from democratic regime to authoritarian regime.14 The
survivability of a regime (including the democratic regime of the
US, as a matter of fact) depends upon the performance of the regime
itself. A polity cannot provide economic prosperity, welfare and
domestic order -- the overall good living standards -- if the
leaders do not care for the common good. In a simple language,
Nigeria will not survive if the leaders typically subscribe to the
prevalent habits of decay in Nigeria that encourage corrupt
practices as necessary and sufficient means to ends.
Conclusion
To conclude, the basic argument of this paper is quite simple.
Democracy is the best form of government when its principles are
enforced. The military governance is the worst option for the
reasons adumbrated at the beginning of this paper. However, one must
recognize that democracy, just in name, does not stop a criminal
from being a criminal. All we know (about the democratic process) is
that over a period of time, the institutions, the economic
structure, and the whole business of laws, and law-making will be
maintained according to the wishes and desires of the people. This
is only true if all other matters so vital to the success of a
country (e.g., patriotism, commitment, great vision, investments on
the part of the leaders and the elite, and genuine consideration for
others) are taken seriously by those who are elected in a democracy.
Indeed, it is pure illusion to assume that answers to any society’s
problems will be forthcoming by mere repetition of democracy (as if
it were an incantation against the evils perpetuated by men against
men) nor by an authoritarian military rule (established under the
guise of curbing corruption). Nigeria will continue to experience
economic downturn, and democracy is bound to fail in Nigeria, as it
has failed at least twice, if the [civilian] leaders and the elite
fail to provide and maintain the overall good living standards of
the people -- the welfare of the state.
Therefore, success of a democratic government depends upon the
morally guided and sagacious leaders (and the elite) who are
determined to work for the growth and development of every aspect of
the whole country, be it political development (democracy), economic
development, or good human relations. When this commitment is
demonstrated, there will be economic growth -- the people will be
well fed. And when people are well fed, they are likely to obey
laws, respect the rights of others, accept conventional means of
political participation, and generally observe the principles and
the values of democracy. The maxim that "a hungry man is an angry
man," underscores this point.
Above all, economic prosperity brings other developments that are
conducive for democracy, namely, industrialization, communication,
and most importantly, education which fosters a good understanding
of say the rule of law, and harmonic ethnic relations. These
developments encourage, advance, and sustain democracy, and they can
only come about in a strong economy built and maintained by TRULY
educated Nigerian leaders, i.e., Nigerians with the common sense to
understand that investment at home is the engine of economic growth.
Only these kinds of men and women will say NO to the prevailing
value system that encourages and endorses corrupt practices in
Nigeria. Only these kinds of men and women will say NO to
disobedience to laws, inter-ethnic rivalries, intra-ethnic conflicts
and bigotry, excessive display of wealth, and arrogance. Only these
kinds of men and women will say NO to neglect of true education,
embezzlement of public funds, colonial mentality, and inferiority
complex. Only these men and women will say YES to the principle of
charity begins at home, and not abroad, consequently encouraging
investment in Nigeria, instead of creating greener pastures abroad.
In sum, democracy (DE), when its principles are religiously
enforced, brings economic growth because more people tend to invest
in a democracy (as explained at the beginning of this paper).
Economic growth (EG), on the other hand, is a sine qua non for
maintaining democracy (DE). However, the preservation of democracy
and maintenance of economic growth are a function (f) of the good
leaders (GLs) who are determined to work for the growth and
development of every aspect of the whole country. Symbolically,
this:
DE <===> GE = f (GLs)
If Nigerians continue to ignore this obvious fact, the next republic
will follow the same failed path of the previous ones, all things
being equal.
Notes
1. See, in particular, Howard Zinn, "How Democratic Is America," in
Robert E. DiClerico and Allan S. Hammock (ed.), Points of View:
Readings in American Government and Politics,(New York: McGraw-Hill,
Inc., 1995), 2-13; Janda, et al., The Challenge of Democracy:
Government in America, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995),
33-37.
2. Alexander A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War
(Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980), 386.
3. Henry Bienen, (ed.) The Military and Modernization,(Chicago:
Aldine, 1971); Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of
Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western
States," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64 (1970),
1131-1148. Henry Bienen, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and
Governments, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976).
4. Ibid.
5. For details, see Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa,
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).
6. See, Izevbuwa Osayimwese and Sunday Iyare, "The Economics of
Nigerian Federalism: Selected Issues in Economic Management,"
Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 21 (Fall 1991), 97.
Pat McGowan, and Thomas Johnson, "Six Coups in Thirty Years -
Further Evidence Regarding African Military Coups d'Etat," The
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 24 (1986), 540-546.
Ladipo Adamolekun, "Introduction: Federalism in Nigeria," Publius:
The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 21 (Fall 1991), 2-3.
See Eric Umeh, "Debt Crisis in Nigeria: Is it Macroeconomic Debtor
Mismanagement
or Imprudent Credit Lending? A Case Study," Unpublished Master's
Thesis, Texas
Woman's University, Denton, Texas, May 1992, 41-42.
10. Ibid.
11. "We at the Citibank had a large account deposited FROM NIGERIA
(my emphasis). When the Nigerian government changed hands in a
military coup, some of the new authorities came to claim the money
of someone in the previous regime. They were NASTY THUGS (emphasis
mine). We called the police, and the police did some checking. They
came back to me the next day and said, 'Mr. Dessauer, you don't have
to worry about these fellows anymore.' We put them on a plane to
Nigeria and told the Nigerian embassy if they ever tried this stunt
again we would send all Nigerians home." [Statements by John
Dessauer, the former top Citibank official (Swiss branch), as quoted
in THE NIGERIAN, May, 1996, p. 3.]
12. African Herald, July 1998, 12
13. Online Posting. Washington Post: http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WAPO/
19980720/v000021-072098-idx.html
14. Henry Bienen, The Military and Modernization, (Chicago: Aldine,
1978), 221.
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